Georgia State University College of Law

Reading Room
Georgia Business Court Opinions

5-13-2015

Viken Securities Limited, Order Granting Plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Judgment on all Defendants'
Counterclaims
Melvin K. Westmoreland
Fulton County Superior Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/businesscourt
Part of the Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, Business Organizations
Law Commons, and the Contracts Commons
Institutional Repository Citation
Westmoreland, Melvin K., "Viken Securities Limited, Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on all Defendants'
Counterclaims" (2015). Georgia Business Court Opinions. 347.
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/businesscourt/347

This Court Order is brought to you for free and open access by Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in Georgia Business Court Opinions
by an authorized administrator of Reading Room. For more information, please contact mbutler@gsu.edu.

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGI
VIKEN SECURITIES LIMITED, a foreign
corporation, SPRINGBIRNE INVESTMENTS, INC.,
a foreign corporation, FELIPE SECURITIES
LIMITED, a foreign corporation, VEENA
MIRCHANDANI, SONIY A MIRCHANDANI,
ASHA SHIVDASANI, and SAJNEE
SADARANGANI,
Plaintiffs,
v.
NA VIN DAD LAN I and ALICIA DADLANI,
Defendants. '

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

FILED IN OFFICE
MAY 1 3 2015
OEPUTY CLERK SUPERIOR COURT
FULTON COUNTY, GA

Civil Action No. 2014cv241970

Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on all Defendants'
Counterclaims
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment as to
Defendants' Counterclaims. Plaintiffs in this action sued Defendant Navin and Alicia Dadlani
for alleged false representations about an investment opportunity.

Defendants Navin and Alicia

Dadlani filed their Counterclaims on March 5, 2014 and amended their Counterclaims on
January 29,2015.
13,2014,

I

Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice on May

and so the Counterclaims are the only pending claims in this case. Upon

consideration of the briefs and materials submitted on the Motion, oral argument of counsel and
the record of the case, this Court finds as follows:

I Plaintiffs changed counsel and refiled a Renewed Complaint against Navin Dadlani only alleging breach
of two contracts, breach of fiduciary duty, and promissory estoppel. Viken Securities Limited, et al., v.
Navin Dadlani, 2014cv2502l5 (Fulton Sup. Ct.). These claims are not at issue for purposes of this Order
and are discussed in a separate order seeking summary judgment on these claims.
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By way of background only, the Counterclaims arise out of Plaintiffs' conduct after the
Plaintiffs lost millions of dollars they invested in the Vision Fund through a British Virgin
Islands company called Tiberius. Plaintiffs received notice in March of2009 that the Vision
Fund had stopped paying out redemption requests or had "gated." Following the loss, Plaintiffs
and other family members who are not named parties in this action.' blamed their nephew and
cousin, Navin Dadlani, for his role in convincing them to invest in Vision Fund through Tiberius,
and the family retained a UK lawyer, Keith Oliver of Peters & Peters, LLP, and a private
investigator, Wayne Black, to conduct an investigation. Defendants have asserted the following
Counterclaims against Plaintiffs: (1) Defamation, (2) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress,
(3) Trespass, (4) Conspiracy, (5) Punitive Damages, (6) Attorneys' Fees, and (7) Breach of
Indemnification Agreement.
For purposes of the counterclaims, the evidence shows that Wayne Black visited the
Dadlani home on March 14,2012

around 6:00 p.m. According to Mrs. Dadlani's testimony, she

noticed Mr. Black's car in her driveway outside the gate by the call box, about one-third of the
way up her driveway, as she was having dinner with her children. She testified he was there for
about ten to fifteen minutes and the location of the car would prevent anyone from leaving the
house. Mr. Black later reported the house was dark and there was a car in the driveway. Mrs.
Dadlani testified the house can only be seen from the Dadlanis' property. Mrs. Dadlani never
saw Mr. Black leave his car or had any contact with Mr. Black during this time, but could see a
person taking pictures. Mrs. Dadlani testified she tried to locate her cell phone to call an off-

PlaintiffYeena Mirchandani's husband, BK Mirchandani, and her son (Navin Dadlani's cousin), Suren
Mirchandani, are non-parties but it appears that BK was the source of much of the family'S wealth and
that his son, Suren, acted as a financial advisor for the family members and the corporate entities in which
the family members had a stake. For clarity, the Court will refer to the Mirchandanis by first name.
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duty officer who lived in the neighborhood, but she could not locate her phone. She did not try

to call 9-1-1.
Mrs. Dadlani also testified she received approximately twenty to forty calls that night
from a number she did not recognize and she did not answer the phone calls. She finally
answered a call at around 9:00 p.m. after putting her children to bed. Wayne Black identified
himself as a private investigator hired by a UK law firm. He told Mrs. Dadlani he had been
trying to contact her all day about Vision Fund and Tiberius and said Mr. Dadlani was involved
in a criminal investment scheme and fraud. Mr. Black then stated he knew Mr. Dadlani was out
of town and he wanted to meet with Mrs. Dadlani right away to discuss Mr. Dadlani's
involvement in a Ponzi scheme. Mrs. Dadlani told Mr. Black not to call again or come back to
her property. The Dadlanis rely on an email to show Mr. Black returned the next day, March 15,
a fact that is disputed and Mr. Black denies. There is no testimony based on personal knowledge
placing Mr. Black back at the property on March 15.
Navin Dadlani testified he heard Plaintiffs were making defamatory statements about Mr.
Dadlani to his father, sisters and deceased grandmother accusing Mr. Dadlani of stealing their
money. There is no direct testimony from Navin's father, sisters, or now-deceased grandmother
or any other evidence of defamatory statements against Navin.
Navin Dadlani also claims that Suren Mirchandani offered him indemnification for his
cooperation with the family's investigation into Tiberius and the Vision Fund. Navin Dadlani
relies on an email dated October 31, 2011 from Suren that states Navin "may take this letter as
mine and my Fathers [sic] assurances that, provided you cooperate fully and, it goes without
saying, tell the complete truth, we will not use any of that information against you personally in
any proceedings we are advised to pursue, and we will hold you harmless against any claims that

3

may be brought against you as a consequence of that truthful cooperation."

Mr. Dadlani then

attended a meeting on November 8-9,2011 with Mr. Oliver and Suren. According to the
meeting minutes, Mr. Oliver stated "provided the process started today is one of complete
cooperation, ... we are willing to indemnify [Navin Dadlani] against further proceedings."

In his

deposition, Suren testified he was acting on behalf of Plaintiffs Viken, Springbime, Felipe,
Veena, Soniya, Asha, and Sajnee when he offered Navin indemnification.

Following the

agreement, Plaintiffs allowed an action pending in the U.K. to lapse.
Summary judgment should be granted when the movant shows "there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw."
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c).

To avoid summary judgment, "an adverse party may not rest upon the

mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this Code section, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial." § 9-11-56( e). "Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge" and "shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in the evidence." Id.
"Hearsay, opinions, and conclusions in affidavits are inadmissible on summary judgment."
Langley v. Nat'l Labor Grp., Inc., 262 Ga. App. 749, 751 (2003).
I.

Trespass

The Dadlanis assert Mr. Black committed trespass when he visited their home on March
14,2012

at the direction of Plaintiffs. The right of enjoyment of private property is an absolute

right of every citizen and an action will lie against anyone who unlawfully interferes with that
enjoyment. O.C.G.A. § 51-9-1.

Under Georgia law, "a trespasser is one who, though peacefully

or by mistake, wrongfully enters upon property owned or occupied by another." Lee v. S.
Telecom Co., 303 Ga. App. 642, 644 (2010) (citations omitted). Georgia law recognizes the

4

doctrine of the innocent trespasser, and while the issue of whether the trespass was willful or
innocent is generally for the jury to decide, the Court has, in some circumstances ruled on this
issue as a matter of law. See id. (reversing grant of summary judgment on trespass claim); but
see C. W Matthews Contracting Co., Inc. v. Wells, 147 Ga. App. 457, 458 (1978) (finding

contractor was an innocent trespasser as a matter of law and holding the trial court erred in
denying motion for directed verdict). Here, there is no evidence Mr. Black acted willfully. To
the contrary, Mr. Black did not go any further than the gate and the call box and there is no other
evidence Mr. Black was asked to leave in the 10 to 15 minutes he was in the driveway. As such,
the Court believes this claim would not stand even if brought directly against Mr. Black, which it
is not.
Even ifMr. Black's actions constituted a wrongful trespass, the Dadlanis have not
presented any evidence imputing Mr. Black's trespass to Plaintiffs. "The principal s~all not be
liable for the willful trespass of his agent unless done by his command or assented to by him."
O.C.G.A. § 10-6-61.

Mr. Black averred he was not directed to act by Plaintiffs and he was

acting as an independent contractor, not an agent. There is no evidence Plaintiffs directed Mr.
Black to visit the Dadlani's home, much less that Plaintiffs directed him to trespass upon the
property. The Dadlanis point to an email chain between Mr. Black, Suren and Mr. Oliver sent
the day after Mr. Black visited the property' as evidence Plaintiffs ratified the trespass. To the
contrary, Mr. Black reported the house was dark, there was a car in the driveway, and he spoke
to Alicia by phone and she was alone with her children so he did not want to knock on the door
after dark. Mr. Black did not notify Suren or Mr. Oliver he had trespassed. It follows that
without evidence that Mr. Black notified Suren or Mr. Oliver of the trespass, there can be no
There is a disagreement about the time stamps for the emails since all three recipients were in different
time zones, but the first email in the chain is a report from Wayne Black about his attempts to meet with
and call Mrs. Dadlani,
3
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evidence that they ratified the trespass on their own behalf or on the behalf of Plaintiffs. As the
Dadlanis have failed to present evidence that non-party Mr. Black's alleged trespass was directed

or ratified by Plaintiffs, the motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim for trespass is
GRANTED.
II.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The Dadlanis also claim Mr. Black was hired with the intention of harassing and
intimidating the Dadlanis and Mr. Black's actions caused Mrs. Dadlani emotional distress. To
recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a party must show four elements: "(1) the
conduct was intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) the conduct
caused emotional distress and (4) the emotional distress was severe." Amstadter v. Liberty
Heathcare Corp., 233 Ga. App. 240, 242-43 (1998).

"Whether a claim rises to the requisite

level of outrageousness and egregiousness to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress is a question oflaw." Vidrine v. Am. Prof'l Credit, Inc., 223 Ga. App. 357,
359 (1996). Insults, threats, annoyances, and petty annoyances are not enough; the conduct
"must be of such serious import as to naturally give rise to such intense feelings of humiliation,
embarrassment, fright or extreme outrage as to cause severe emotional distress." Moses v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. 187 Ga App 222, 225 (1988) (affirming summary judgment because

supervisor leaving a telephone message threatening former employee that he would "find your
butt in court or your neck broken somewhere" was not egregious or outrageous as a matter of
law); see also Ghodrati v. Stearnes, 314 Ga App 321 (2012) (affirming summary judgment
because anxiety and sleeplessness caused by co-worker's racist and derogatory name-calling and
signs in the workplace were not sufficiently severe emotional distress).
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Here, Mr. Black's actions were not so outrageous or egregious they would naturally give
rise to the type of severe emotional distress that would be actionable under Georgia law. The
uncontroverted evidence shows that although Mrs. Dadlani considered calling for help, she did
not. Although the phone kept ringing, she testified she was able to read her children a story and
put them to bed before deciding to answer the phone. There is no evidence Mr. Black attempted
to contact Mrs. Dadlani after she told him to stop. As such, the Court finds as a matter oflaw the
conduct did not rise to the level of egregiousness contemplated under Georgia law and Mrs.
Dadlani's alleged emotional distress did not rise to a severe level that is actionable.
Further, even ifMr. Black's actions were sufficiently egregious and outrageous, there is
no evidence Plaintiffs are liable for Mr. Black's actions as a contractor.

See O.C.G.A. § 51-2-

5(5) (requiting ratification of the unauthorized wrong act of the independent contractor). Mr.
Black, Suren, and Mr. Oliver are not themselves parties to this suit and there is no evidence Mr.
Black's investigatory methods were directed or controlled by any of these three men, much less
the Plaintiffs.
To the extent the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress has been raised by
Mr. Dadlani, there is no evidence of any egregious acts towards him within the two year statute
oflimitations or any evidence of resultant emotional distress.

See O.C.G.A.

§ 9-3-33 ("Actions

for injuries to the person shall be brought within two years after the right of action accrues, ... ").
As such, the motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress is GRANTED.

III.

Defamation

Mr. Dadlani claims Plaintiffs defamed him. "Generally, there are four elements in a
cause of action for defamation: (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff; (2)
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an unprivileged communication to a third party; (3) fault by the defendant amounting at least to
negligence; and (4) special harm or the actionability of the statement irrespective of special
harm." Renton v. Watson, 319 Ga. App. 896, 900, (2013) (citations omitted). Damage is

inferred when the defamatory statements "imput[ e] to another a crime punishable by law" or
"mak] es] charges against another in reference to his trade, office, or profession, calculated to
injury him therein." O.C.G.A. § 51-5-4 (a) & (b). A defamation claim must provide "notice of
both the content of the allegedly defamatory statements and the context in which those
statements were made." Wylie v. Denton, 323 Ga. App. 161, 170 (2013) (emphasis added). The
statute of limitations for a defamation claim is one year, and therefore, evidence of statements
made prior to March 5, 2013 will be disregarded. See O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 ("Actions for injuries
to the person shall be brought within two years after the right of action accrues, except for
injuries to the reputation, which shall be brought within one year after the right of action accrues,
... ).
Here, Navin Dadlani claims the Plaintiff Individuals were making defamatory statements
about Mr. Dadlani to his father, sisters and deceased grandmother accusing Mr. Dadlani of
stealing their money. However, the only evidence of these defamatory statements is
inadmissible hearsay-Navin himself testified he was told Plaintiffs told these various family
members that he stole money. There is no direct testimony from Navin's father, sisters or nowdeceased grandmother about the alleged defamation of Navin. Navin Dadlani has failed to
produce a letter, email, affidavit, or other evidence of a defamatory statement made by or on
behalf of any of the Plaintiffs after March 5, 2013. Furthermore, there is no evidence the
corporate defendants directed the individual Plaintiffs to make defamatory statements or the
individual Plaintiffs were agents of the corporations at all. See, e.g., Desmond v. Troncalli
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Mitsubishi, 243 Ga App 71,75 (2000) (affirming summary judgment because there was no

evidence that corporation directed, authorized, or ratified statements made by its employees). As
such, the motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim for defamation of Navin Dadlani is
GRANTED.
IV.

Indemnification

Plaintiffs argue Mr. Dadlani's claim for indemnity should be dismissed because he
waived his right to be indemnified when he failed to provide requested documents on December
7,2011. In an October 31,2011 email, Suren offered indemnity and to hold Navin Dadlani
harmless for anything discovered during an interview in November in exchange for Mr.
Dadlani's cooperation. Mr. Dadlani attended the November meeting and Plaintiffs allowed the
UK litigation to lapse. However, Mr. Dadlani refused Suren's attorneys' request for information
in early December and when Suren threatened legal action, Mr. Dadlani stated in an email there
was nothing he could do to stop him and he would not try. While waiver is normally a question
for the jury, the Court may decide the issue as a matter of law when the facts and circumstances
essential to the waiver issue are clearly established. See Forsyth County v. Waterscape Servs.,
LLC, 303 Ga. App. 623, 630 (2010) (citation omitted). From Mr. Dadlani's email it is clear that
he was no longer willing to cooperate even if that meant being subjected to legal action and
waiving his right to indemnity.
Further, the application of indemnity provisions contained in written contracts is a
question oflaw for the court. See Georgia Ports Auth. v. Harris, 243 Ga. App. 508, 513 (2000)
aff'd, 274 Ga. 146, (2001) (citing Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Williams, 183 Ga.App. 845,
846(2) (1987».

Even if the indemnity provision was enforceable and had not been waived,

Plaintiffs are suing Mr. Dadlani on two purported contracts from 2009 and 2010, not based on
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information gleaned from him at the November 2011 meeting. Therefore, even if the indemnity
agreement was given effect, there is no evidence the agreement would apply to this case. As
such, the motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim for indemnification is GRANTED.
V.

Conspiracy, Punitive Damages, and Attorneys' Fees

"To recover damages for a civil conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must show that two or more
persons, acting in concert, engaged in conduct that constitutes a tort." "Absent the underlying
tort, there can be no liability for civil conspiracy."

Wilson v. Mountain Valley Cmty. Bank, 328

Ga. App. 650,652 (2014), reconsideration denied (July 30, 2014), cert. denied (Feb. 2, 2015)
(citation omitted). As Defendants have failed to present any evidence supporting the underlying
tort counterclaims, the counterclaim for conspiracy also fails and, as such, the motion for
summary judgment on the counterclaim for conspiracy is GRANTED.
Likewise, "[t]he derivative claims of attorney fees and punitive damages will not lie in
the absence of a finding of compensatory damages on an underlying claim." D. G. Jenkins
Homes, Inc. v. Wood, 261 Ga. App. 322,325 (2003) (citing Wade v. Culpepper, 158 Ga. App.
303, 305 (1981 ).

As such, the motion for summary judgment on the counterclaims for punitive

damages and attorneys' fees is GRANTED.

SO ORDERED, this 11th day of May, 2015.

~\<__.

~~~
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

Bryan M. Knight
Nick T. Sears
KNIGHT JOHNSON, LLC
One Midtwon Plaza
1360 Peachtree Street
Suite 1201
Atlanta, Georgia 30309
bknight@knightjohnson.com
nsears@knightjohnson.com

Attorneysfor Defendants:
Richard L. Robbins
Vincent Russo
Robbins Ross Alloy Belinfante Littlefield,
LLC
999 Peachtree Street, N.E.
Suite 1120
Atlanta, GA 30309
Tel: (678) 701-9381
Fax: (404) 601-6733
lTobbins@robbinsfinn.com
vrusso@robbinsfirm.com
Cynthia M. Monaco
The Law Offices of Cynthia M. Monaco
The Fred French Building
551 Fifth Avenue, 31st Fl.
New York, NY 10176
(646) 380-2456
cmonaco@cY!}thiamonacolaw.com
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